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SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND THE
AUTHORIZATION TO USE PERSONAL
COMPUTERS: UNINTENDED EFFECTS OF EU
AND US LAW ON IT SECURITY
Lukas Feilert
Abstract
It used to be that owners ofpersonal computers typically hadfull
and exclusive authorization to use their computers. This was
primarily due to the open architecture introduced with the IBM
PersonalComputer in the 1980s andproliferatedin the 1990s. Recent
developments bear evidence of an increasing disconnection between
the concept of ownership and that of authorization to use a personal
computer (including mobile devices such as notebooks, subnotebooks, cell phones, smartphones, and PDAs): interference with
the closed architecture employed by Apple's iPhone is claimed to
constitute a violation under 17 U. S.C. § 1201; the EULA for Windows
7 supposedly grants Microsoft the right to disable a user's operating
system if the user is deemed to be in violation of the license terms; the
Google Chrome Terms of Service supposedly grant Google the right
to install new versions of its product without notice; on July 17, 2009,
Amazon remotely deleted certain titles, including Animal Farm and
Nineteen Eighty-Four from its customers' ebook devices without
consent or notice. This paperanalyzes the extent to which EU and US
contract law and (para-)copyrightlaw disconnect the concepts of
ownership and authorizationto use a personalcomputer and how that
affects the security ofpersonalcomputers.
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1. INTRODUCTION

It used to be that owners of personal computers typically had full
and exclusive authorization to use their computers. The open
architecture introduced with the IBM Personal Computer in the 1980s
(and proliferated in the 1990s) made it technically possible for owners
to install and uninstall any and all programs or even install an entirely
different operating system.
However, this congruence of the concepts of ownership and
authorization to use a personal computer is not a legal necessity.
Authorization to use a computer system is a legal right that may be
restricted or transferred to other parties than the owner by means of
statutory law or a contract. This paper will analyze the extent to
which EU and US contract law and (para-)copyright2 law result in the
de-authorization of the owner or the authorization of third parties to
use the owner's personal computer (which, for the purpose of this
paper, shall also include mobile devices such as notebooks, subnotebooks, cell phones, smartphones, and PDAs).
The following examples trigger scrutiny of the extent to which
EU and US law disconnect the concepts of ownership and
authorization to use personal computers:
Apple claimed that the circumvention of the SIM-lock or a
'jailbreak" 3 on its iPhone constituted a breach of contract and/or a
violation of 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) as it involved the circumvention of a
technological measure that effectively controlled access to a work
protected under 17 U.S.C. 4 When Apple released their version 1.1.1

1. See, e.g., ERIC G. SWEDIN & DAVID L. FERRO, COMPUTERS: THE LIFE STORY OF A
TECHNOLOGY 101 (2005) (discussing the EBM PC's open architecture); cf JONATHAN
ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET-AND HOW TO STOP IT 19 (2008) (emphasising the
importance of an open PC architecture for "generativity").
2.
Paracopyright refers to legal protections related to but going above and beyond
traditional copyright. See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 12A.18[B] (Matthew Bender Rev. Ed. 2010) (1963).
3.
The term "jailbreak" refers to the act of unlocking the iPhone's file system to allow
the execution of programs not authorized by Apple. See, e.g., Timothy J. Maun, Comment,
iHack, Therefore iBrick: Cellular Contract Law, the Apple iPhone, and Apple's Extraordinary
Remedy for Breach, 2008 Wis. L. REV. 747, 751 (2008).
4. Responsive Comment of Apple Inc., In the matter of Exemption to Prohibition on
Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, No. RM
2008-8, at 2 (US Copyright Office Feb. 2, 2009), http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2008/
responses/apple-inc-3 1.pdf (claiming that a jailbreak would result in "in copyright infringement
[...] and breach of contract"). In 2007 Apple released the following statement: "Apple strongly
discourages users from installing unauthorized unlocking programs on their iPhones. Users who
make unauthorized modifications to the software on their iPhone violate their iPhone software
license agreement." See Mark Hachman, Update: Apple Issues Warning on iPhone Hacking,
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update for the iPhone on September 27, 2007, users who had
previously unlocked their iPhone or had performed a "jail break"
discovered that the installation of the update disabled ("bricked")
their iPhones entirely.5
In 2007, Microsoft updated installations of Windows XP and
Windows Vista even if the owner of a personal computer had
deliberately disabled the auto-update feature.
In 2005, Sony BMG distributed music CDs that, when inserted
into a computer's CD drive, installed spyware and a rootkit that
created vulnerabilities that could be exploited by other malware.7
The Microsoft License Terms for Windows 7 provides that if
Microsoft deems the licensee to be in violation of the license terms,
the licensee "may not be able to use or continue to use the software,"
supposedly granting Microsoft the authority to remotely disable a
user's operating system. 9
On July 17, 2009, Amazon remotely deleted certain titles,
including Animal Farm and Nineteen Eighty-Four, from its
customers' "Kindle" ebook devices without consent or prior notice.o
The disconnection of the concepts of ownership and of
authorization to use personal computers occurs in two distinct ways:
by de-authorizing owners to use their personal computers, and by
granting third parties authority over a personal computer. The former
is addressed in Part 2 and the latter in Part 3. Part 4 will then assess
PCMAG, Sept. 24, 2007, http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2188296,00.asp.
5. See Katie Hafner, Altered iPhones Freeze Up, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2007, at Cl,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/29/technology/29iphone.html.
6. See J. Nicholas Hoover, Microsoft Updates Windows Without User Permission,
Apologizes,
INFORMATIONWEEK,
Sept.
13,
2007,
see
http://www.informationweek.com/news/internet/showArticle.jhtml?articlelD=201806263;
also Bruce Schneier, Microsoft Updates Both XP and Vista Without User Permission or
Notification, http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/09/microsoftupdat.html, (Sept. 17,
2007, 6:12 A.M.).
7. See Mark Russinovich, Sony, Rootkits and Digital Rights Management Gone Too
http://blogs.technet.com/markrussinovich/archive/2005/10/3 1/sony-rootkits-and-digitalFar,
rights-management-gone-too-far.aspx (Oct. 31, 2005 at 11:04 A.M.); see also J. ALEX
HALDERMAN & EDWARD W. FELTEN, LESSONS FROM THE SONY CD DRM EPISODE 1, (2006),
http://itpolicy.princeton.edulpub/sonydrm-ext.pdf.
Home
Basic,
Windows
7
Terms,
Software
License
8. Microsoft
http://www.microsoft.com/About/LegalVEN/US/IntellectualProperty/UseTerms/Default.aspx
(last visited Sept. 13, 2010).
9. Cf Mark Rasch, Vista's EULA Product Activation Worries, SECURITYFOCUS, Nov.
20, 2006, http://www.securityfocus.com/columnists/423 (discussing the same issue in the
context of the Windows Vista license agreement).
10. Brad Stone, Amazon Erases Orwell Books From Kindle, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2009,
at B l, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/18/technology/companies/18amazon.html.
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the effects of this disconnection on the security of personal
computers."
2. DE-AUTHORIZING OWNERS

The acquisition of ownership of a personal computer, in
principle, transfers full and exclusive authorization to the new owner
to use that computer in any way or form. The discussion below
describes various statutory and corresponding contractual means that
effectively result in de-authorizing the owner from certain uses of his
computer (or parts of it).
2.1. Statutory Prohibitionsof the Circumvention of
Technological ProtectionMeasures
Digital technologies, most notably the Internet, have not only
drastically expanded the possibilities for copyright holders to
distribute their works, but have also created new ways for mass
copyright infringement. Technological protection measures were
thought to be the "silver bullet" against copyright infringement
committed by digital means.13 As no technological protection
measure can be one hundred percent "secure," at least for a long-term
period, copyright holders have successfully lobbied for a prohibition
of the circumvention of technological protection measures.14
2.1.1. Statutory Prohibitions
US as well as EU law provides statutory prohibitions regarding
the circumvention of technological protection measures. These
prohibitions will be discussed in Part 2.1.1.2 and 2.1.1.3 respectively.

11. The idea that a disconnection between ownership and authorization would undermine
security was first articulated by information security expert Bruce Schneier. See Bruce Schneier,
Everyone Wants to "Own" Your PC, WIRED, May 4, 2006, http://www.wired.com/politics/
security/commentary/securitymatters/2006/05/70802, reprinted in BRUCE SCHNEIER, SCHNEIER
ON SECURITY 161-63 (2008).
12. See CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE
TO THE NETWORK ECONOMY 81-102 (1999).
13. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY
AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 157 (2004).
14. However, as Hal Varian has argued, it seems that stronger DRM helps system
vendors more than the content industry, because the computer industry has fewer competitors in
this space (Microsoft, Sony, and Apple being the only serious suppliers for DRM platforms).
See Hal Varian, Keynote Address to the Third Digital Rights Management Conference, Berlin,
Germany (Jan. 13, 2005); cf Neil Weinstock Netanel, Temptations of the Walled Garden:
DigitalRights Management and Mobile Phone Carriers,6 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L.
77, 77 (2007).
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Both legislative regimes have to be seen in the context of
international law which is briefly discussed first.
2.1.1.1. InternationalBackground
Article 11 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) 15 obligated all
contracting parties to provide adequate legal protection and effective
legal remedies against the "circumvention of effective technological
measures that are used by authors in connection with the exercise of
their rights under the WCT or the Berne Convention and that restrict
acts, in respect of their works, which are not authorized by the authors
concerned or permitted by law."' 6

2.1.1.2. 17 U.S.C. § 1201
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)1 7 was enacted
on October 28, 1998, inter alia, to implement the WCT in the United
States. The DMCA specifically introduced 17 U.S.C. § 1201 to
implement article 11 of the WCT.'"
Section 1201 contains three principal prohibitions regarding the
circumvention of technological protection measures:19
Section 1201(a)(1) prohibits the circumvention of a
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work
protected under Title 17 (hereinafter referred to as an "access control
measure").2 0 Section 1201(a)(3)(A) states that to "circumvent a
technological measure" means "to descramble a scrambled work, to
decrypt an encrypted work, or otherwise to avoid, bypass, remove,
deactivate, or impair a technological measure, without the authority of
15. See WIPO Copyright Treaty, December 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17, at 10
(1997); see also Council Decision 2000/278, 2000 O.J. (L 89) 6 (EC) (approving the WIPO
Copyright Treaty on behalf of the European Community with regard to matters within its
competence).
16. WIPO Copyright Treaty, December 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17, at 10
(1997). For an analysis of article 11 of the WCT, which is outside the scope of this paper see
generally, Jane C. Ginsburg, Legal Protectionof Technological Measures Protecting Works of
Authorship: International Obligations and the US Experience, COLUMBIA PUBLIC LAW
RESEARCH PAPER No. 5-93, Aug. 2005, http://ssm.com/abstract-785945.
17. Codified in 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205 (2006).
18. See 144 CONG. REC. S4886 (daily ed. May 14, 1998) (Senator Leahy noting that
"[t]he bill adds a new chapter [12] to US copyright law to implement the [WCT]
anticircumvention [...] provisions").

19. Prior to the DMCA, some courts held that it was lawful to sell products which
enabled consumers to circumvent technological protection measures, because consumers had a
right under 17 U.S.C. § 117 to make a backup or archival copy of a program. See, e.g., Vault
Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
20. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2006).
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the copyright owner."2 1
Section 1201(a)(2) states that no person shall manufacture,
import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise traffic in any
technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof, that:
(A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of
circumventing an access control measure; (B) has only limited
commercially significant purpose or use other than to circumvent an
access control measure; or (C) is marketed for use in circumventing
an access control measure. 22
Section 1201(b) contains the same prohibition as the
aforementioned § 1201(a)(2) but instead of referring to an access
control measure refers to "a technological measure that effectively
protects a right of a copyright owner under Title 17" (hereinafter
referred to as a "copy control measure"). 23
Section 1201 introduced a rather complex regulatory scheme
from which two important distinctions arise. First, it differentiates
between the act of circumvention itself (§ 1201(a)(1)) and the
trafficking in circumvention technology (§ 1201(a)(2) and
§ 1201(b)).24 Second, it distinguishes access control measures from
copy control measures: the prohibition on circumvention only applies
to access control measures (§ 1201(a)(1)), whereas the prohibition on
trafficking circumvention technology applies to access control
measures and copy control measures (§ 1201(a)(2) and § 1201(b)). 25
Access control measures (§ 1201(a)) are of primary interest here
as they limit the ability to lawfully access one's own personal
computer or parts thereof. For this reason, this chapter will focus on
§ 1201(a).26
The first issue to be addressed is how to distinguish between
access control measures and copy control measures. Access control
21.
22.
23.

17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(A).
17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2).
17 U.S.C. § 1201(b).

24.

See 3

§ 12A.03[C]
§ 1201(a)(2)

MELVILLE B. NIMMER

& DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON

COPYRIGHT

(Matthew Bender Rev. Ed. 2010) (1963) (discussing the similarities between
and § 1201(b)). 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 3 NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 12A.18[B] (Matthew Bender Rev. Ed. 2010) (1963).
25. See Markus Fallenbdck, On the Technical Protection of Copyright: The Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, the European Community Copyright Directive and Their
Anticircumvention Provisions, 7 INT'L J. COMM. L. & POL'Y 1 (2002), available at http://
www.ijclp.net/files/ijclpweb-doc_4-7-2003.pdf.
26. For a discussion on whether (para-)copyright law grants copyright owners an "accessright," see Thomas Heide, Copyright in the EU and US: What "Access-Right"?, 48 J. COPR.
SOC'Y 363 (2000).
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measures are defined in § 1201 (a)(3)(B) as any technological measure
that "in the ordinary course of its operation, requires the application
of information, or a process or a treatment, with the authority of the
copyright owner, to gain access to the work." 2 7 However, this
statutory definition does not clarify the meaning of the term "access."
At this point, it should be noted that, in the field of computer and
information security, it is universally understood that "access
controls" do not only determine whether but also what kind of access
is being granted to a subject. 28
In Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v Static Control Components, Inc., the
District Court stated that the term "access" should be given its
ordinary and customary meaning, which is the "ability to enter, to
obtain, or to make use of."2 9 The Court held that an authentication
protocol 30 implemented in the plaintiffs printer software in order to
authenticate printer cartridges manufactured by the plaintiff
constituted an access control measure because the authentication
protocol controlled the ability to make use of the printer firmware by
preventing the printer from functioning. On appeal, the 6th Circuit
disagreed while applying the same definition of "access." 32 The Court
held that § 120 1(a) does not naturally apply when the "work protected

§ 1201(a)(3)(B)

27.

17 U.S.C.

28.

See, e.g., NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTER

(2006).

SECURITY: THE NIST HANDBOOK 195 (1995), available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/
nistpubs/800-12/handbook.pdf (specifically stating with regard to "logical access control" that
"[i]t may also be important to control the kind of access that is afforded"). See also NAT'L INST.
OF STANDARDS AND TECH., MINIMUM SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR FEDERAL INFORMATION

AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS 2 (2006), available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/
fips200/FIPS-200-final-march.pdf (stating with regard to access control that "[o]rganizations
must limit information system access to authorized users . . . and to the types oftransactionsand
functions that authorized users are permitted to exercise" (emphasis added)); INT'L ORG. FOR
STANDARDIZATION, ISO/IEC 27000: INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY - SECURITY TECHNIQUES INFORMATION SECURITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS - OVERVIEW AND VOCABULARY 1 (2009)

(stating that the term access control "means to ensure that access to assets . . . is authorized and
restricted based on business and security requirements"); James S. Tiller, Access Control, in
OFFICIAL (ISC) GUIDE TO THE CISSP CBK 93, 95 (Harold F. Tipton & Kevin Henry eds.,
2007).
29. Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 2d 943, 967
(E.D. Ky. 2003), vacated and remanded, 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004) [hereinafter Lexmark ].
30. The Lexmark printers used an SHA-1 based Message Authentication Code which
prevents replay attacks and is based on a secret key. For an explanation of Message
Authentication Codes, see BRUCE SCHNEIER, APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY 455 (Phil Sutherland
ed., 2d ed. 1996).
31. Lexmarkl, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 953.
32. Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 546 (6th Cir.
2004) [Lexmark Il].
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under this title" is otherwise accessible.33 As the object code of the
printer software was accessible by directly reading the printer
memory-without the benefit of the authentication sequence-the
authentication sequence did not restrict "access" to the protected
work, rendering § 1201(a) inapplicable.34 The court therefore
effectively imposed the requirement that access control measures
must (at least) control the "ability to [] obtain a copy of the work."3 5
A measure that only limits the ability to modify or execute a program
would therefore fall outside this definition.3 6
This is in line with other widely noted cases, such as
RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc. In RealNetworks, Inc. v.
Streambox, Inc., the court held that a "secret handshake" between the
plaintiffs RealServer and RealPlayer software constituted an "access
control" under § 1201(a), while a "Copy Switch" used by RealServer
software to signal that RealPlayer software should disable the copy
functionality of a particular media stream, was considered a "copy
control measure" under § 1201(b). 37 In Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Corley, the 2nd Circuit held that "CSS," the encryption technology
used by motion picture studios on DVDs to prevent the unauthorized
viewing and copying of motion pictures, is an "access control
measure." 38
The second issue to be addressed is that of "effective" access
control. Section 1201(a) only covers technological measures that
"effectively" control access to a protected work. 39 The statute
provides that an access control measure is "effective" if the measure
"in the ordinary course of its operation," requires the authority of the
copyright owner, to gain access to the work. 4 0 As a result, a rather low

33. Id. at 547.
34. Id at 546-47.
35. Id. at 547.
36. In the field of computer security, on the other hand, measures that only determine
whether a file can be executed or written to are also considered "access controls." See SIMSON
GARFINKEL ET AL., PRACTICAL UNIX AND INTERNET SECURITY 131 (Deborah Russell ed., 3d

ed. 2003).
37. RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., No. 2:99-02070, 2000 WL 127311, at *7
(W.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 2000).
38. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001). For the trial court
decision see Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, Il1 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
39. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2006); 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(2)(A)-(C). Note that
§ 1201(b) also contains an effectiveness requirement-it only covers technological measures
that "effectively" protect a right of a copyright owner. See also 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(b)(1)(A)-(C)
(2006).
40. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(B) (2006) (defining the phrase "effectively controls
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standard is used by most courts. 4 1
The last issue to be discussed with regard to the scope of
§ 1201(a) is that of "circumvention." Section 1201(a)(3)(A) states that
to "circumvent a technological measure" means "to descramble a
scrambled work, to decrypt an encrypted work, or otherwise to avoid,
bypass, remove, deactivate, or impair a technological measure,
without the authority of the copyright owner".42 Somebody who has
the authority to circumvent would therefore not violate § 1201 (a)(1). 43
Some commentators suggest that authority to access the work is
sufficient to evade a violation of § 1201(a)(1)." In Chamberlain
Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc., the Federal Circuit seems to
have gone in that direction.45 At issue in the case was the software
embedded in the garage door systems manufactured by the plaintiff;
specifically, whether the plaintiffs software was protected by
copyright and an access control measure. The court examined
whether use of a remote control manufactured by the defendant, in the
plaintiffs garage door system, would constitute a circumvention
under § 1201(a)(1) and make the defendant liable under § 1201(a)(2)
for trafficking in circumvention technology. 47 The court sided with
the defendant, holding that the plaintiffs customers did not violate
access to a work" for both § 1201(a)(1) and § 1201(a)(2)); see also 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b)(2)(B)
(2006) (noting that § 1201(b) uses a similar definition of effectiveness: a copy control measure
is "effective" if "the measure, in the ordinary course of its operation, prevents, restricts, or
otherwise limits the exercise of a right of a copyright owner under this title").
41. See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 318
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that whether the measure is a "strong means of protection" or not is
irrelevant). See also I.M.S. Inquiry Mgmt. Sys. v. Berkshire Info. Sys. 307 F. Supp. 2d 521,
531-33 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that password protection constitutes an effective technological
protection measure). However, the defendant's motion to dismiss was granted on grounds that
accessing the plaintiffs computer system through unauthorized use of a password issued to a
party other than the defendant did not constitute a "circumvention" targeted by 17 U.S.C.
§ 1201(a). But cf Agfa Monotype Corp. v. Adobe Sys., 404 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1036 (N.D. Ill.
2005) (holding that embedded "bits" which encode permissions do not by themselves constitute
an "effective" technological protection measure).
42. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(A) (2006) (emphasis added).
43. Id. (emphasis added).
44. See Markus Fallenback, On the Technical Protection of Copyright: The Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, the European Community Copyright Directive and Their
Anticircumvention Provisions, 7 INT'L J. COMM. L. & POL'Y 1, 19 (2002), available at http:/
www.ijclp.net/files/ijclp web-doc-4-7-2003.pdf (framing authority to access a work as a
question of whether "access" refers only to the initial access, or also to all subsequent acts of
gaining access); see also JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT: PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ON THE INTERNET 151 (2001).

45.
46.
47.

See Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Tech., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
See id. at 1183-85.
See id. at 1203.
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§ 1201(a)(1) since the Copyright Act authorized them to use the copy
of the plaintiffs copyrighted software embedded in the garage door
systems that they purchased. 48 The court effectively read "authority of
the copyright owner" as authority to use the protected work as
opposed to authority to circumvent the access control.49 By
trafficking in alternative remote controls the defendant therefore did
not violate § 120 1(a)(2).o
However, the plain language of § 1201(a)(3)(A) clearly states
that authority has to be granted with regard to circumvention, i.e. the
activities described in said subsection (descramble, decrypt, otherwise
avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or impair a technological
measure). 5 Accordingly, in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, the
2nd Circuit ruled that it was irrelevant whether an individual who
buys a DVD has the authority to view the DVD. 52
Section 1201(a)(3)(A) would only exempt from liability those users
who have the authority to decrypt an encrypted DVD but not those
who merely have the authority to view a DVD.13
The different readings of the authorization requirement of
§ 1201(a) by the Federal Circuit in Chamberlain Group, Inc. v.
Skylink Technologies, Inc. and by the 2nd Circuit in Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. Corley are particularly significant with regard to
software installed on a personal computer: users are typically
authorized to use installed software but not to circumvent any
technological measures protecting it. If the former type of
authorization was deemed sufficient by the courts with regard to
personal computer software, many circumventions would escape
§ 1201(a) liability. Such a judicial position is, however, for the
reasons discussed supra, rather unlikely.

48. See id. at 1204 (holding that Chamberlain "has failed to show [...] the requisite lack
of authorization").
49. See id (holding that Chamberlain's customers are immune from § 1201(a)(1)
circumvention liability because "[t]he Copyright Act authorized Chamberlain's customers to use
the copy of Chamberlain's copyrighted software embedded in the [garage door openers] that
they purchased").
50. Id.
51. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(A) (2006) (providing that to "circumvent a technological
measure" means "to descramble a scrambled work, to decrypt an encrypted work, or otherwise
to avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or impair a technological measure, without the authority of
the copyright owner").
52. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 444 (2d Cir. 2001).
53. See id.
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2.1.1.3. The EU Computer ProgramsDirective and the
EU Copyright Directive
European Union (EU) law5 4 provides three distinct statutory
schemes for technological protection measures: the EU Computer
Programs Directive (hereinafter referred to EUCPD),55 the EU
Copyright Directive (hereinafter referred to as EUCD), 56 and the EU
Conditional Access Directive.57 The latter is not of interest here as it
concerns access to a service and therefore has no direct impact on a
user's authority to use his or her personal computer.
While the EUCPD applies only to technological protection
measures that protect computer programs, the EUCD applies to the
measures that protect all other copyrighted works. 8 At first blush, it
would seem that only the EUCPD, which deals exclusively with
software protection measures, is significant to the issue of authority to
use one's personal computer. However, as will be described below,
the de-authorizing effect of a technological protection measure can be
equally significant even if the work protected is not a computer
program. Due to its broader scope, the EUCD shall be discussed first.
Similar to 17 U.S.C. § 1201, Article 6 of the EUCD provides a
distinction between the act of circumvention itself (Article 6(1)) and
trafficking in circumvention technology (Article 6(2)).5 9 Article 6(1)
of the EUCD obligates EU Member States to provide adequate legal

54. All 27 Member States having deposited their ratification instruments in Rome, the
Treaty of Lisbon will enter into force on Dec. 1, 2009. Art. I of the Treaty on European Union
as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon provides that "[t]he Union shall replace and succeed the
European Community." In anticipation of this succession, this paper generally refers to the EU
where previously referred to as the EC. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European
Union, art. 1, Dec. 13, 2007, 2010 O.J. 83-16.
55. See generally Parliament and Council Directive 2009/24, 2009 O.J. (L 111) 16-22
(EC) (re-codifying Council Directive 91/250, 1991 O.J. (L 122) 42-46 (EEC) and taking into
account the amendments performed by Council Directive 93/98, 1993 O.J. (L 290) 9-13 (EEC)).
See Recital 1Parliament and Council Directive 2009/24.
56. Parliament and Council Directive 2001/29, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10-19 (EC).
57. Parliament and Council Directive 98/84, 1998 O.J. (L 320) 54-57 (EC).
58. Recital 50 EUCD provides that the EUCD "should not apply to the protection of
technological measures used in connection with computer programs, which is exclusively
addressed in that Directive" (referring to Council Directive 91/250, now Parliament and Council
Directive 2009/24). See Council Directive 91/250, O.J. (L 122) 42-46 (EC); see also Parliament
and Council Directive 2009/24, 2009 O.J. (L 111) 16-22 (EC).
59. Pursuant to Article 6(1) of the EUCD, "adequate legal protection" has to be provided
against circumvention while Article 6(2) obligates Member States to "provide adequate legal
protection against the manufacture, import, distribution, sale, rental, advertisement for sale or
rental, or possession for commercial purposes" of certain circumvention tools. Parliament and
Council Directive 2001/29, art. 6(2), 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10-19 (EC).
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protection against the circumvention of any "effective technological
measures," which is carried out "with knowledge, or reasonable
grounds to know," that such objective is being pursued.60
This wording goes beyond 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) in the
sense that it requires that the person performing the circumvention do
so knowingly or at least negligently ("with reasonable grounds to
know"). 6 1 The term "technological measures," as it is used in
Article 6(1) of the EUCD, is defined in Article 6(3) of the EUCD "as
any technology, device or component that, in the normal course of its
operation, is designed to prevent or restrict acts, in respect of works or
other subject matter, which are not authorized by the rightholder of
any copyright or any right related to copyright as provided for by law
or the sui generis right" provided for in Chapter III of the EU
Database Directive.62
According to Article 6(3) of the EUCD, a technical measure
shall be deemed "effective" where the use of a protected work or
other subject-matter is controlled by the rightholders through
"application of an access control or protection process, such as
encryption, scrambling or other transformation of the work or other
subject-matter or a copy control mechanism, which achieves the
protection objective".6 3
This wording indicates that Article 6(1) of the EUCD prohibits
the circumvention of both access control measures and copy control
measures. The circumvention prohibition of Article 6(1) of the EUCD
is therefore, at least in this regard, broader than that of 17 U.S.C.
§ 1201 which only prohibits the circumvention of access control
measures, not copy control measures.6 As Article 6(1) of the EUCD
covers both types of measures, their distinction, which is important
under 17 U.S.C. § 1201, is almost irrelevant here.
Article 6(2) of the EUCD prohibits the trafficking of

60. Parliament and Council Directive 2001/29, art. 6(1), 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10-19 (EC).
61.
Markus Fallenbdck, On the Technical Protection of Copyright: The Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, the European Community Copyright Directive and Their
Anticircumvention Provisions,7 INT'L J. COMM. L. & POL'Y 1, 39 (2002), availableat http://
www.ijclp.net/files/ijclpweb-doc4-7-2003.pdf.
62. See Parliament and Council Directive 2001/29, art. 6(3), 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10-19
(EC); Parliament and Council Directive 96/9, 1996, art. 8, O.J. (L 77) 20-28 (EC).
63. Parliament and Council Directive 2001/29, 2001, art. 6(3), O.J. (L 167) 10-19 (EC)
(emphasis added).
64. Compare Parliament and Council Directive 2001/29, art. 6, 2001, O.J. (L 167) 10-19
(EC), with Part 2.1.1.2 supra.
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circumvention technology. 5 It states that Member States shall
provide adequate legal protection against "the manufacture, import,
distribution, sale, rental, advertisement for sale or rental, or
possession for commercial purposes of devices, products or
components or the provision of services" which fulfill any of the
following three conditions: (a) they are "promoted, advertised or
marketed for the purpose of circumvention of any effective
technological measures; (b) they have only a limited commercially
significant purpose or use other than to circumvent; or (c) they are
primarily designed, produced, adapted or performed for the purpose
of enabling or facilitating" circumvention.6 6 The substance and even
the wording of Article 6(2) of the EUCD is almost identical to that of
17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) (regarding access control measures) 67 and 17
U.S.C. § 1201(b) (regarding copy control measures).
This section will discuss the EUCPD which, according to Recital
50 EUCD, applies exclusively to "technological measures used in
connection with computer programs." 6 9 Article 7(1)(c) of the EUCPD
provides that Member States shall provide appropriate remedies
against the acts of "putting into circulation, or the possession for
commercial purposes of, any means" whereby the sole intended
purpose is "to facilitate the unauthorized removal or circumvention of
any technical device which may have been applied to protect a
computer program." 70
Article 7(1)(c) of the EUCPD is far more narrow than Article 6
of the EUCD or 17 U.S.C. § 1201. First, it only prohibits "acts of
putting into circulation" and "the possession for commercial
purposes."7 1 The act of circumvention itself is therefore not
prohibited.
Second, a plain reading of Article7(1)(c) of the EUCPD only
prohibits putting "means" into circulation or possessing "means." 72
Unlike Article 6(2) of the EUCD or 17 U.S.C. § 1201, providing
services for the purpose of facilitating circumvention is not
65.
66.
67.
19 (EC),
68.
19 (EC),
69.
70.
71.
72.

See Parliament and Council Directive 2001/29, art. 6(2), 2001 O.J (L167) 10-19 (EC).
Id.
Compare Parliament and Council Directive 2001/29, art. 6(2), 2001 O.J. (L167) 10with 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2).
Compare Parliament and Council Directive 2001/29, art. 6(2), 2001 O.J. (L167) 10with 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b).
See Parliament and Council Directive 2001/29, 2001 O.J. (L167) 10-19 (EC).
Parliament and Council Directive 2009/24, art. 7(1)(c), 2009 0.1. (L 111) 16-22 (EC).
Id.
See id.
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prohibited.n
Third, it only covers "means" where the "sole intended purpose
of which is to facilitate the unauthorized removal or circumvention"
of a technical protection measure.7 4 In contrast to Article 6(2) of the
EUCD and 17 U.S.C. § 1201, Article 7(l)(c) of the EUCPD does not
cover technology that has only limited commercially significant
purpose, or use other than to circumvent, or that is promoted,
76
advertised or marketed for the purpose of circumvention.
Finally, Article 7(l)(c) of the EUCPD only protects "technical
device[s] which may have been applied to protect a computer
program."77 The term "device" implies a limitation of scope to
physical (i.e. hardware-based) protection measures. However, the
German, French and Spanish language versions all use the equivalent
of the term "means" ("Mittel" in German, "moyen" in French, and
Under the principle of uniform
"medio" in Spanish).
interpretation,7 9 the different language versions must be given a
uniform interpretation. As there is a divergence between the versions,
Article 7(1)(c) of the EUCPD must be interpreted by reference to the
purpose and general scheme of the EUCPD as a whole. As the
EUCPD is concerned with software, it seems logical that this
provision captures not only hardware-based but also software-based
measures protecting software.

73. Compare id, with Parliament and Council Directive 2001/29, art 6(2), 2001 O.J.
(L167) 10-19 (EC), and 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b).
74. See Parliament and Council Directive 2009/24, art. 7(l)(c), 2009 O.J. (L 111) 16-22
(EC).
75. Compare Parliament and Council Directive 2009/24, art. 7(1)(c), 2009 O.J. (L Ill1)
16-22 (EC), with Parliament and Council Directive 2001/29, art 6, 2001 O.J. (L167) 10-19 (EC),
and 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2)(B), and 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (b)(1)(B).
76. Compare Parliament and Council Directive 2009/24, art. 7(l)(c), 2009 O.J. (L 111)
16-22 (EC), with Parliament and Council Directive 2001/29, art 6, 2001 O.J. (L167) 10-19 (EC),
and art. 6(2)(a) EUCD with 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2)(C) and (b)(1)(C).
77. See Parliament and Council Directive 2009/24, art. 7(l)(c), 2009 O.J. (L 11) 16-22

(EC).
78. The German version of Article 7(1)(c) provides: "das Inverkehrbringen oder der
Erwerbszwecken dienende Besitz von Mitteln . . . ."; Council Directive 91/250, art. 7(l)(c),
1991 O.J. (L122) 42-46 (EEC) (Ger.). The French version provides: "mettre en circulation ou
ddtenir Ades fins commerciales tout moyen . . . ." Council Directive 91/250, art. 7(l)(c), 1991
O.J. (L122) 42-46 (EEC) (Fr.). The Spanish version provides: "la puesta en circulaci6n o
tenencia con fines comerciales de cualquier medio . . . ." Council Directive 91/250, art. 7(1)(c),
1991 O.J. (L122) 42-46 (EEC) (Sp.).
79. Case 30/77, Rdgina v. Bouchereau, 1977 E.C.R. 1999.
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2.1.2. Statutory Exemptions

2.1.2.1. 17 U.S.C. § 1201
Before examining the exemptions contained in 17 U.S.C. § 1201
itself, the relationship between § 1201 and the fair use doctrine
(incorporated in 17 U.S.C. § 107) needs to be examined.
Section 1201(c)(1) provides that "[n]othing in this section shall affect
rights, remedies, limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement,
including fair use, under this title."so Courts are split regarding the
interpretation of this clause.
In Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, the 2nd Circuit rejected
the defendant's assertion that § 1201(c)(1) should be read to allow the
circumvention of technology protecting copyrighted material when
"fair use" exempts the infringing use of the material at issue from
copyright liability. 8 ' The court held that § 1201(c)(1) merely clarifies
that § 1201 is only concerned with the question of circumvention (or
the trafficking of circumvention technologies), and not the question of
whether material obtained in a manner made illegal by § 1201 can be
82
legitimately used by reason of fair use.
On the other hand, in Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink
Technologies, Inc. the Federal Circuit rejected a reading of § 1201(a)
that would grant a copyright holder unlimited rights to hold
circumventors liable for merely accessing a work, even if that access
involved only rights that the Copyright Act grants to the public. 83
Such a reading would be contrary to § 1201(c)(1), and the court
thereby interpreted § 1201 as only prohibiting "forms of access that
bear a reasonable relationship to the protections that the Copyright
Act otherwise affords copyright owners." 84 The court further stated
that the DMCA cannot allow the plaintiff "to retract the most
fundamental right that the Copyright Act grants consumers: the right
to use the copy of Chamberlain's embedded software that they

80. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1). Inter alia, this refers to the exclusive rights of a copyright
holder under § 106 of the Copyright Act and defenses against copyright infringement such as
fair use (§ 107 of the Copyright Act).
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 443 (2d Cir. 2001).
81.
82. Id.
83. Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Tech., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1200 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
See also Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng'g & Consulting, Inc., 421 F.3d 1307,
1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
84. Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Tech., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
See also Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng'g & Consulting, Inc., 421 F.3d 1307,
1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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purchased."85
The opposing conclusions drawn by courts from § 1201(c)(1) is
indeed remarkable86 and leaves users with a significant legal risk
should they decide to rely on a fair use defense. Section 1201 itself
creates two types of possible exemptions: the ones codified in
§ 1201(d) to (j) and those created by the Librarian of Congress in
accordance with § 1201(a)(1)(B) and (C). We shall first examine the
former.
Title 17 U.S.C. § 1201 codifies various exemptions to the
prohibitions of § 1201: exemption for nonprofit libraries, archives,
and educational institutions (§ 1201(d)); 87 law enforcement,
intelligence, and other government activities (§ 1201(e));88 reverse
engineering (§ 1201(f)); 89 encryption research (§ 1201(g)); 90
exceptions regarding minors (§ 1201(h)); 91 protection of personally
identifying information (§ 1201(i)); 9 2 and security testing
(§ 1201(j)). 9 3 Regarding the issue of computer security and the
authority to use one's own personal computer, only § 1201(f), (g), (i),
and (j) are of relevance. 94
Section 1201(f) provides exemptions for reverse engineering that
is performed for the purpose of obtaining interoperability
information. 95 According to § 1201(f)(1), it does not constitute a
85. Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Tech., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
86. From a perspective of statutory interpretation, it also seems noteworthy that the
Chamberlain court and the Corley court cited two different but consecutive pages of the
legislative history, yet drawing contrary conclusions. See Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1196;
Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1203; Corley, 273 F.3d at 443, n.13; H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at
25, 26 (1998).
87. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(d) (this section only provides an exemption for 17 U.S.C.
§ 1201(a)(1)).
88. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(e) (this section provides exemptions for 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(1),
1201(a)(2) and 1201(b)).
89. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f) (this section provides exemptions for 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(1),
1201(a)(2) and 1201(b)).
90. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(g) (this section provides an exemption for 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)
and a narrow exemption for 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2)).
91.
17 U.S.C. § 1201(h) (this section provides an exemption for 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(1)
and 1201(a)(2)).
92. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(i) (this section only provides an exemption for 17 U.S.C.
§ 1201(a)(1)).
93. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(j) (this section provides an exemption for 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(1)
and (2)).
94. For an extensive description of these exemptions see Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright
Legislationfor the "DigitalMillennium," 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 137, 148-52 (1999).
95. Reverse engineering can be defined as the process of discovering technological
information about computer hardware or software by examining it. Cf ELDAD EILAM,
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violation of § 1201(a)(1) to circumvent an access control measure that
has been applied to a computer program if a right to use the program
has been lawfully obtained and the circumvention is performed for the
sole purpose of identifying and analyzing those elements of the
program that are necessary to achieve interoperability between an
independently created computer program 96 and other programs.
Section 1201(f)(2) and (3) provide similar exemptions regarding
§ 1201(a)(2) and (b).97 However, § 1201(f) clearly only targets people
that aim to develop interoperable software. 98 It does not allow access
control measures to be circumvented for the purpose of installing (as
opposed to developing) interoperable software. 99 Section 1201(f)
therefore has minimal effect on the authority to use one's own
personal computer. 100

Section 1201(g) provides an exemption from § 1201(a)(1) and
(a)(2)o0 for encryption research, which § 1201(g)(1)(A) defines as
"activities necessary to identify and analyze flaws and vulnerabilities
of encryption technologies applied to copyrighted works," if these
activities are conducted to "advance the state of knowledge in the
field of encryption technology or to assist in the development of
encryption products .... 1 02 Although important in the field of
cryptography, this exemption also has little effect with regard to the
authority to use one's own personal computer.
Section 1201(i) creates an exemption from § 1201(a)(1)-but not

REVERSING: SECRETS OF REVERSE ENGINEERING 3-23 (2005).
96.

See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT

§

12A.04[B][1] (Matthew Bender Rev. Ed. 2010) (1963).
97.

See 3 MELVILLE

B. NIMMER

& DAVID NIMMER,

NIMMER ON

COPYRIGHT

§§

12A.04[B][2], 12A.04[B][3] (Matthew Bender Rev. Ed. 2010) (1963).
98. See Davidson & Assoc. v. Internet Gateway, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1185 (E.D. Mo.
2004) (holding that a § 1201(f) defense was not available because the defendants did not try to
independently create an interoperable computer program but a program that was intended as a
functional alternative), aff'd sub nom. Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir.
2005). Cf Jane C. Ginsburg, The Pros and Cons of Strengthening Intellectual Property
Protection: Technological ProtectionMeasures and Section 1201 of the US Copyright Act, 11,
07-137,
Feb.
1, 2007,
PUBLIC
LAW
RESEARCH
PAPER No.,
COLUMBIA
http://ssm.com/abstract-960724.
99. Davidson & Assoc. v. Internet Gateway, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1186 (E.D. Mo.
2004).
100.

See generally 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT

§ 12A.04[B] (Matthew

Bender Rev. Ed. 2010) (1963).
101. The exemption from 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) only applies regarding "another person
with whom [the researcher] is working collaboratively." 17 U.S.C. § 1201(g)(4)(B). It is
therefore a very limited one.
102. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(g)(1)(A).
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from (a)(2) or (b)-ifthe circumvention is performed for the purpose
of protecting personally identifying information (PII). 103 A natural
person may circumvent an access control measure if the access
control measure (or the work it protects) contains the "capability of
collecting or disseminating personally identifying information
reflecting the online activities"1 0 4 of the person who seeks to
circumvent the measure. According to § 1201(i)(1)(B), for the
exemption to apply, it is further required that the measure (or the
work it protects) collects or disseminates the PII "without providing
conspicuous notice of such collection or dissemination," and without
providing the capability to prevent or restrict such collection or
dissemination.os This drastically narrows the applicability of
§ 1201(i).' 06 If the user so much as receives a conspicuous notice of
the data collection or dissemination, the exemption does not apply. 107
Furthermore, the exemption does not apply to PII in general but only
to PII that reflects "online activities." 0 8 Protected software that
collects information about offline activities (e.g., writing a document
using a locally installed word processor instead of Google Docs) falls
outside the scope of § 1201(i).

103.
104.
105.

17 U.S.C.
17 U.S.C.
17 U.S.C.

106.

See

§ 1201(i).
§ 1201(i)(1)(A).
§ 1201(i)(1)(B).

3 MELVILLE B.

NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,

NIMMER ON

COPYRIGHT

§ 12A.05[B][1]

(Matthew Bender Rev. Ed. 2010) (1963).
107. The statute states that a circumvention is only permissible if the collection or
dissemination of PII is performed "without providing conspicuous notice [...], and without
providing [...] the capability to prevent or restrict such collection or dissemination." 17 U.S.C.
§ 1201(i)(1)(B) (emphasis added). This strongly suggests that both conspicuous notice and a
prevention/restriction capability must be absent in order for the exception to apply. Accordingly,
the presence of either of the conditions eliminates the exemption. See JAY DRATLER,
CYBERLAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM

§ 3.03[4],

n. 129 (Rev. Ed.

2009) (2000). The legislative history is inconsistent on the issue of whether conspicuous notice
alone eliminates the exemption: H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, pt.2, at 45 (1998) (hereinafter
Commerce Rep.) states that § 1201(i) was "designed to ensure that if a copyright owner
conspicuously discloses [the] data gathering capability, and the consumer is given the capability
to curtail or prohibit effectively any such gathering or dissemination of personal information,
then the consumer could not legally circumvent the technological protection measure"
(emphasis added). Contrary to what is suggested by the statute, this language indicates that a
consumer could still claim the exemption if only one of the two conditions (e.g. conspicuous
notice) is fulfilled. In its background section, the Commerce Rep. emphasizes the problem of
"surreptitiously gather[ing] consumers' personal information." Id. at 27 (emphasis added).
However, this problem is perfectly addressed by conspicuous notice alone. But see 3 MELVILLE
B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12A.05[B][1] (Matthew Bender Rev.
Ed. 2010) (1963) (stating that for the exemption to be eliminated, conspicuous notice "and" a
prevention/restriction capability must be present).
108. Id.
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Section 1201(j) provides an exemption from § 120 1(a)(1) and (2)
for "security testing." 09 "Security testing" is defined in § 1201(j)(1)
as "accessing a computer, computer system, or computer network,
solely for the purpose of good faith testing, investigating, or
correcting, a security flaw or vulnerability, with the authorization of
the owner or operator of such computer, computer system, or
computer network."110 It is important to recognize that this definition
of security testing very much centers on the term "vulnerability,"
which is used synonymously with "security flaw.""' However,
vulnerability is only one of many elements that can be addressed
when mitigating security risks to a computer, computer system, or
computer network. Other elements are: the asset, safeguards,
vulnerabilities, threats, and threat agents. Section 1201(j) allows an
owner of a computer system to circumvent an access control measure
in an effort to mitigate his security risk by "testing, investigating, or
correcting, a [ ] vulnerability." 1 2 However, § 12010) does not
provide an exemption for other risk mitigation strategies such as
reducing the asset (e.g., testing, investigating, or correcting the
amount of information stored by a protected work; cf § 1201(i)
above) or adding safeguards (e.g., encrypting information resources
protected by the access control measure).
Furthermore, as the term "security testing" itself indicates, the
primary purpose of § 12010) is not to allow the improvement of the
security of the personal computer on which the access control
measure is installed.113 Section 1201(j)(3) states that one of the
factors to be considered in determining if a person qualifies for the
§ 12010) exemption is whether the information derived from the
security testing was used solely to promote the security of the owner
or operator of such computer system, or shared directly with the
developer of the computer system. 114
In addition to the exemptions codified in § 1201(d) to (),
subsections 1201(a)(1)(B) and (C) provide a more general exemption

§ 1201()(2);
§ 1201(j)(1).

109.
110.
111.
112.

17 U.S.C.
17 U.S.C.
Id.
Id.

113.

17 U.S.C. § 1201(j).

17 U.S.C.

§ 1201(j)(4).

114. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(j)(3)(B). The second factor to be considered is of limited
importance in this context: whether the information derived from the security testing was used
or maintained in a manner that does not facilitate infringement under Title 17 or a violation of
applicable law other than 17 U.S.C. § 1201, including a violation of privacy or breach of
security pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 1201(j)(3)(B). Id.
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and an associated rulemaking procedure. The prohibition of
§ 1201(a)(1) "shall not apply to persons who are users of "a
copyrighted work which is in a particular class of works, if such
persons are, or are likely to be in the succeeding three-year period,
adversely affected by virtue of such prohibition in their ability to
make noninfringing uses of that particular class of works under" Title
17.115 Identification of those "classes of works" is left up to the
Librarian of Congress pursuant to § 1201(a)(1)(B); every three years,
the Librarian shall make the determination in a rulemaking
proceeding. 1 6 Under § 1201(a)(1)(C), the Librarian shall examine the
following factors in conducting the rulemaking: (i) the availability for
use of copyrighted works; (ii) the availability for use of works for
nonprofit archival, preservation, and educational purposes; (iii) the
impact that the prohibition on the circumvention of technological
measures applied to copyrighted works has on criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research; (iv) the effect of
circumvention of technological measures on the market for or value
of copyrighted works; and (v) such other factors as the Librarian
considers appropriate.1 17
The Librarian of Congress' determination, currently in force,
was published on July 27, 2010."' It superseded the 2006
determination 1 9 which was extended by the Librarian on an interim
basis on Oct. 27 2009.120 The new determination defines six classes of
copyrighted works, of which only three are relevant here: 121
115.

17 U.S.C.

§ 1201(a)(1)(B)

(1999). A very strong argument can be made that creating

an exemption from 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) while not doing so for 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) gives
users the right but not the means to perform a circumvention, leaving those who lack technical
expertise effectively checkmated. See DAVID NIMMER, A RIFF ON FAIR USE IN THE DIGITAL

MILLENIUM COPYRIGHT ACT, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 673, 732-33 (2000). § 1201(a)(1)(B).
116.
17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(B).
17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a)(1)(A).
117.
118. Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for
Access Control Technologies, 37 C.F.R. §201.40(b) (2010). It became effective on the date of
its publication. See 75 Fed. Reg. 43826.
119. 71 Fed. Reg. 68472-80 (Nov. 27, 2006). Prior determinations were published as 68
Fed. Reg. 62011-18 (Oct. 31, 2003) and 65 Fed. Reg. 64556-574 (Oct. 27, 2000). For a content
analysis of the first two proceedings, conducted in 2000 and 2003, see Bill D. Herman & Oscar
Gandy, Catch 1201: A Legislative History and Content Analysis of the DMCA Exemption
(2006), available at
L.J. 121
Proceedings, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
http://ssm.com/abstract-844544. For a review of the Librarian of Congress's 2006 exemption
process see John Haubenreich, The iPhone and the DMCA: Locking the Hands of Consumers,
61 VAND. L. REv. 1507, 1518 (2008).
120. 74 Fed. Reg. 55138-9 (Oct. 27, 2009).
37 C.F.R. § 201.40(b). The three other classes deal with motion pictures on DVDs
121.
that are protected by the Content Scrambling System (CSS) when circumvention is
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1. "Computer programs that enable wireless telephone handsets to
execute software applications, where circumvention is
accomplished for the sole purpose of enabling interoperability of
such applications, when they have been lawfully obtained, with
computer programs on the telephone handset.122
2. "Computer programs in the form of firmware or software that
enable used wireless telephone handsets to connect to a wireless
telecommunications network, when circumvention is initiated by
the owner of the copy of the computer program solely in order to
connect to a wireless telecommunications network and access to
the network is authorized by the operator of the network."1 23
3. "Video games accessible on personal computers and protected
by technological protection measures that control access to
lawfully obtained works, when circumvention is accomplished
solely for the purpose of good faith testing for, investigating, or
correcting security flaws or vulnerabilities." In the case of security
testing, "the derived information has to be used primarily to
promote the security of the owner or operator of a computer" and
must not be used or maintained in a manner that facilitates
copyright infringement or a violation of applicable law. 124
The first class was newly introduced by the 2010 determination
and grants users the authority to "jailbreak" their smartphones-that
is to circumvent technological measures that would otherwise prevent
third party software applications from being installed and run on
smartphones, in particular the iPhone' 25 (hereinafter referred to as the

iPhone Jailbreaking Exemption).12 6

The

iPhone

Jailbreaking

Exemption was proposed by the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF)

accomplished in order to incorporate short portions of motion pictures into new works for the
purpose of criticism or comment, and where the circumvention is necessary for the purpose of
certain educational uses, documentary filmmaking, or noncommercial videos (37 C.F.R.
§ 201.40(b)(1) (2010)); computer programs protected by dongles that prevent access due to
malfunction or damage and which are obsolete (37 C.F.R. § 201.40(b)(5) (2010)); and literary
works distributed in ebook format when all existing ebook editions of the work contain access
controls that prevent the enabling either of the book's read-aloud function or of screen readers
that render the text into a specialized format (37 C.F.R. § 201.40(b)(6) (2010)).
122. 37 C.F.R. § 201.40 (b)(2) (2010).
37 C.F.R. § 201.40 (b)(3) (2010).
123.
124. 37 C.F.R. § 201.40 (b)(4) (2010).
125. See 75. Fed. Reg. 43825, 43828 (July 27, 2010) (noting that "[t]he factual record with
respect to this proposed class focused primarily on Apple's iPhone, although there are
allegations in the record involving other mobile phone manufacturers as well").
126. See Fred von Lohmann, Calling All iPhone Developers: Support EFF's DMCA
Exemption for Jailbreaking, January 8, 2009, http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/01/iphonedevelopers-support-effs-dmca-exemption-jail.
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to address growing concerns over the iPhone's closed architecture
which made it impossible for an owner of an iPhone-without
jailbreaking the device-to install and use third party applications on
the device not previously approved for distribution by Apple through
its App Store. 127 It has to be emphasized that the iPhone Jailbreaking
Exemption applies exclusively to smartphones, but not to other
mobile devices such as an iPad, a laptop, or a traditional PC.
The second class affords owners of a used cell phone the
authority to use the phone-irrespective of any access controls-for
the limited purpose of connecting to a different carrier's network
(referred to hereafter as the SIM Lock Exemption).12 8 A cell phone
acquired from a specific carrier usually ships with firmware that is
programmed to only accept SIN cards from that carrier. By asserting
that the firmware is a copyrighted work that is protected by access
control measures, at least one carrier had previously successfully
argued that "breaking" a SIM lock would constitute a violation under
§ 1201(a). 129 The first court applying the exemption after it was
introduced in 2006 held that unlocking cell phones for the purpose of
selling them for a profit was not for the sole purpose of lawfully
connecting to a wireless telecommunications network and therefore
was outside of the exemption's scope.130
The third class concerns video games accessible on personal
computers if the circumvention is accomplished solely for the purpose
of "good faith testing for, investigating, or correcting security flaws or

127. See id
128. This exemption is based on an almost identical exemption contained in the 2006
determination. Cf 71 Fed. Reg. 68472, 68476 (Nov. 27, 2006). However, the new determination
limited the exemption to "used" cell phones in order not to cover "bulk resellers" who purchase
new mobile phones at subsidized prices and, without actually using them on the networks of the
carriers who market those handsets, resell them for profit. See 75 Fed. Reg. 43825, 43831 (July
27, 2010).
129. See TracFone Wireless, Inc. v. Sol Wireless Group, Inc., No. 05-23279 slip op. at 2-3
(S.D. Fla, Feb. 28, 2006), available at http://www.stopcellphonefraud.com/wpcontent/uploads/l -tracfone-v-sol-wireless-group-inc-et-al.pdf.
129. See TracFone Wireless, Inc. v. Sol Wireless Group, Inc., No. 05-23279 slip op. at 2-3
(S.D. Fla, Feb. 28, 2006), available at http://www.stopcellphonefraud.com/wpcontent/uploads/l -tracfone-v-sol-wireless-group-inc-et-al.pdf.
130. TracFone Wireless, Inc. v. Dixon, 475 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1238 (M.D. Fla. 2007). Note
that this decision applied the SIM lock exemption as defined in the 2006 determination. Cf 71
Fed. Reg. 68472, 68476 (Nov. 27, 2006). However, its holding remains applicable for the new
SIM lock exemption defined in the 2010 determination. For a discussion of the effects of the
SIM lock exemption on iPhone users, see Mark Defeo, Unlocking the iPhone: How Antitrust
Law Can Save Consumersfrom the Inadequacies of Copyright Law, 49 B.C. L. REV. 1037, 1065
(2008).
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vulnerabilities" (hereinafter referred to as the Video Game
Vulnerability Exemption).'3 ' Testing for vulnerabilities typically
involves using the software in ways not expected by the developers
(e.g. providing the software with overlong input data).' 32 The
investigation of a vulnerability will require some degree of reverse
engineering in order to find the particular part of the software that
creates the vulnerability.133 Correcting the vulnerability might require
modifications of the software. 134
This class is based on a class contained in the 2006
determination which covered sound recordings distributed on a CD if
protected by technological measures that "create or exploit security
flaws or vulnerabilities that compromise the security of personal
computers" 35 (hereinafter referred to as the Sony BMG Exemption).
The Sony BMG Exemption had been created in 2006 in response to a
digital rights management system contained on music CDs distributed
by Sony BMG Music Entertainment.1 36 Upon insertion of those music
CDs into a computer's CD drive, a spyware and a rootkit were
installed.137

131.
Letter from Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, United States Copyright Office,
to James H. Billington, The Librarian of Congress, Library of Congress, (June 11, 2010),
available at http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2010/initialed-registers-recommendation-june-112010.pdf.
132.

Cf, e.g., BARTON P. MILLER, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE RELIABILITY OF UNIX

UTILITIES, 32 (Communications of the ACM) (Dec. 1990) (report of an early study showing how
UNIX utilities behave when given unexpected input).
133. For example, if a video game crashes when a username is entered that has more than
a certain amount of characters, it is likely that the video game software, somewhere in the code,
copies the usemame provided as input into a buffer that is too small to store the entire input.
This leads to a so-called "buffer overflow." To correct this vulnerability, it has to be investigated
where in the code the buffer is being written to. Cf JAMES C. FOSTER ET AL., BUFFER
OVERFLOW ATTACKS 161 (2005).

134. If the source code is not available, the binary code of the video game might have to be
modified.
135. 71 Fed. Reg. 68472, 68477 (Nov. 27, 2006).
136. See 71 Fed. Reg. 68477 n. 6 (Nov. 27, 2006). For a detailed rationale see 37 C.F.R. §
201.40(b)(6).
137. Id. This "automatic" installation was only performed if Microsoft Windows'
AutoRun feature was enabled, which it is by default. For a detailed technical description, see
MARK RUSSINOVICH, SONY, ROOTKITS AND DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT GONE TOO FAR

(Oct. 31, 2005), http://blogs.technet.com/markrussinovich/archive/2005/10/31/sony-rootkitsand-digital-rights-management-gone-too-far.aspx; see also J. ALEX HALDERMAN & EDWARD W.
FELTEN, LESSONS FROM THE SONY CD DRM EPISODE (2006), http://www.cse.umich.edu/
-jhalderm/pub/papers/rootkit-secG6.pdf
In response Sony BMG published a program to
uninstall the software. However, the uninstaller itself created new risks. See MARK
RUSSINOVICH, MORE ON SONY: DANGEROUS DECLOAKING PATCH, EULAS AND PHONING
HOME (Nov. 4, 2005), http://blogs.technet.com/markrussinovich/archive/2005/11/04/more-on-
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It might have been argued that § 1201(j) already provided an
exemption for cases covered by the Video Game Vulnerability
Exemption or for cases previously covered by the Sony BMG
Exemption, but in his 2006 recommendation to the Librarian of
Congress, the Register of Copyrights stated that "it is not clear
whether that provision extends to such conduct."138 The ambiguity of
§ 1201(j) is demonstrated by the fact that Mark Russinovich, who first
publicized the details about the Sony BMG "DRM," was actually not
the first to discover it: Edward Felten and J. Alex Halderman
discovered the rootkit a month prior to Russinovich but feared a
lawsuit under § 1201 if they disclosed it without the record label's
authorization. 139
However, in its 2010 determination, the Librarian of Congress
only included an exemption for video game vulnerabilities but no
exemption with regard to sound recordings because no evidence was
presented in the proceeding that "the prohibition on circumvention is
adversely affecting or is likely, in the next three years, to adversely
affect the ability to engage in noninfringing uses of sound

recordings."1 40
The final issue to discuss with regard to statutory exemptions is
whether they can be derogated from by contractual arrangement.
Claims under contract law are of course subject to the Preemption
Doctrine. Congress' power to preempt state law directly stems from
the Supremacy Clause of the US Constitution. 141 Title 17 U.S.C.
§301 provides for an express preemption regarding "all legal or
equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights
within the general scope of copyright as specified by section

sony-dangerous-decloaking-patch-eulas-and-phoning-home.aspx.
138. See 71 Fed. Reg. 68477 (Nov. 27, 2006).
139. See Transcriptof Public Hearing on Exemption to Prohibitionon Circumvention of
Copyright Protection Systems For Access Control Technologies Before Representatives of the
US Copyright Office, (Mar. 31 2006), available at http://www.copyright.gov/
1201/2006/hearings/index.html. See also Anne Broache & Declan McCullagh, Seeking changes
to the DMCA (2006), CNET NEWS.COM, Apr. 3, 2006, http://www.zdnetasia.com/news/
business/0,39044229,39347541,00.htm.
140. 75 Fed. Reg. 43825, 43832 (July 27, 2010). Cf The statutory requirement under 17
U.S.C. § 1201(B) (2006). Only evidence related to access controls for video games was
presented (Macrovision's SafeDisc software and Sony's SecuRom software).
141. US CONST. art. VI, § 2 states "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof [...] shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State
to the contrary notwithstanding."
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106...."142 But § 301 is not applicable in the context of § 1201 as
the latter does not deal with any of the exclusive rights in copyrighted

works enumerated in § 106.143
However, claims under contract law might be subject to a form
of implied preemption if § 1201 is found to be "so pervasive as to
make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the
States to supplement it"'" (field preemptions).145 It remains to be
seen how courts will deal with efforts of "contracting around" the
statutory exemptions of § 1201. In particular, contract claims might
find support in the legal requirement that a circumvention must "not
constitute [ ... ] a violation of applicable law"-which might be
construed to include contract law.14 6 This requirement or similar
forms thereof are contained in the security testing exemption
(§ 1201(j)(2)), the exemption for the protection of personally
identifying information (§ 1201(i)(1)(D)), the encryption research
exemption (§ 1201(g)(2)(D)), the reverse engineering exemption
(§ 1201(f)(3)), and the video game vulnerability exemption (37

C.F.R. § 201.40(b)(4)). 14 7
In summary, the exemptions discussed supra only mitigate

§ 1201's effects to a rather small extent. In particular, none allow the
owner of a personal computer to circumvent technological protection
measures for the purpose of increasing the computer's security.
2.1.2.2. The EU Computer ProgramsDirective and the
EU Copyright Directive
In stark contrast to 17 U.S.C. § 1201, the EUCD only provides
for one statutory exemption from its general prohibitions regarding
the circumvention of protection measures, whereas not a single
exemption is available through the EUCPD.148 Recital 48 of the
142. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2006).
143. Cf Kevin McReynolds, SDMCA Laws: Preemption and Constitutional Issues, 12
UCLA ENT. L. REv. 63, 81 (2004).
144. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
145. The second form of implied preemption, referred to as "conflict preemption" (see
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963) (holding that State
law is preempted where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical
impossibility)) seems a rather remote possibility. For a more extensive discussion on § 1201 and
the issue of preemption see Kevin McReynolds, SDMCA Laws: Preemption and Constitutional
Issues, 12 UCLA ENT. L. REv. 63, 81 (2004).
146. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(g)(2)(d). See also MAUN, supra note 3, at 791 .
147. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006); 37 C.F.R. §201.40(b)(4).
148.

See THOMAS DRElER & BERNT HUGENHOLTZ, CONCISE EUROPEAN COPYRIGHT LAW

235 (2006).
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EUCD states that the legal protection of technological measures
"should not hinder research into cryptography."1 49 If a circumvention
of technological measures is performed for the purpose of
cryptography research, the prohibitions of Article 6 of the EUCD do
not apply. However, it should be noted that cryptography is
traditionally defined as "the art and science of keeping messages
secure" as opposed to the art and science of breaking encrypted
messages (referred to as "cryptanalysis").15 1
Furthermore, regarding the prohibition of circumventions
performed for the purpose of making noninfringing uses, the EUCD
implements a remarkable approach. 5 2 Article 6(4) of the EUCD
provides that only in the absence of voluntary measures taken by
rightholdersl 53 shall Member States take appropriate actions to ensure
that noninfringingl 5 4 uses are possible.' 5 5 This provision therefore
prohibits all circumventions by default (whether or not performed to
make noninfringing uses) and leaves much latitude and discretion to
Member States for regulating technical protection measures with

149. Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 22 May 2001,
on the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information
society, Official Journal of the European Communities, Nr. L 167 of June 22, 2001, 10-19,
<http://eurat
available
online
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2001:167:0010:0019:EN:PDF>.
BRUCE SCHNEIER, APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY I (2d ed. 1996).
150.
Cryptography and cryptanalysis are collectively referred to as cryptology; see id
151.
152. This issue has been subject of much debate between the European Commission, the
Council, and the European Parliament. See Communication from the Commission to the
European Parliamentpursuant to the second subparagraphofArticle 251 (2) of the EC Treaty
concerning the common position of the Council on the adoption of a Directive of the European
Parliament and of the Council on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related
rights in the information Society, SEC(2000) 1734 final (Oct. 20, 2000). See also Markus
Fallenback, On the Technical Protection of Copyright: The Digital Millennium Copyright Act,
the European Community Copyright Directive and Their Anticircumvention Provisions, 7 INT'L
J. COMM. L. & POL'Y 1, 42 et. seq. (2002), available at http://www.ijclp.net/files/ijclp-webdoc_4-7-2003.pdf.

153. These measures include agreements between rightholders and other parties
concerned. See Communicationfrom the Commission to the European Parliamentpursuant to
the secondsubparagraphofArticle 251 (2) of the EC Treaty concerningthe common position of
the Council on the adoption of a Directive of the EuropeanParliamentand of the Council on the
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information Society,
SEC(2000) 1734 final (Oct. 20, 2000).
154. "Noninfringing" refers to "exception[s] or limitation[s] provided for in national law
in accordance with Article 5(2)(a), (2)(c), (2)(d), (2)(e), (3)(a), (3)(b) or (3)(e)." Id.
Cf URS GASSER & MICHAEL GIRSBERGER, TRANSPOSING THE COPYRIGHT
155.
DIRECTIVE: LEGAL PROTECTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL MEASURES IN EU-MEMBER STATES 9
(Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School) (2004), http://
cyber.law.harvard.edu/media/files/eucd.pdf
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respect to the uses they must permit. 156 The consequence of
insufficient voluntary measures must be emphasized: it does not give
a user permission to circumvent, but rather, it triggers a Member
State's obligation to compel rightholders to permit certain
noninfringing uses.' 5 ' A circumvention of technological protection
measures is therefore categorically prohibited under Article 6 of the
EUCD. This is in stark contrast to 17 U.S.C. § 1201 which provides
circumvention
the
from
exemptions
statutory
numerous
prohibition. 158
2.1.3. Comparative Assessment of 17 U.S.C. § 1201, the
EU Computer Programs Directive and the EU
Copyright Directive
Title 17 U.S.C. § 1201 as well as the EUCD and the EUCPD
effectively de-authorize the owner of a personal computer to use
certain software components of the computer. Although 17 U.S.C. §
1201-in contrast to the EUCD and the EUCPD-does contain
significant statutory exemptions (in particular regarding security
testing), it does not contain a "fair use" exemption. 15 9 Neither do the
EUCD or the EUCPD take the exceptions and limitations of
60
traditional copyright into account.1
Ultimately, the extent to which the prohibition of the
circumvention of a specific technological protection measure results
61
in a de-authorization has to be determined on a case-by-case basis.1

156. Cf Markus Fallenbdck, On the Technical Protection of Copyright: The Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, the European Community Copyright Directive and Their
Anticircumvention Provisions, 7 INT'L J. COMM. L. & POL'Y 1, 42 et. seq. (2002), available at
http://www.ijclp.net/files/ijclp_web-doc_4-7-2003.pdf, cf also Thomas P. Heide, Copyright,
Contract and the Legal Protectionof Technological Measures - Not "the Old Fashioned Way":
Providing a Rationale to the "Copyright Exceptions Interface" 50 J. of Copyright Soc. of the
U.S.A. at 11 (2003), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=418000.
157.

See NICOLA LUCCHI, DIGITAL MEDIA & INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 58 (2006). For

how the EUCD was transposed in the EU Member States see, e.g., URS GASSER & MICHAEL
TRANSPOSING THE COPYRIGHT DIRECTIVE: LEGAL PROTECTION OF
GIRSBERGER,
TECHNOLOGICAL MEASURES IN EU-MEMBER STATES 12-17 (Berkman Center for Internet &

Society at Harvard Law School) (2004), http://cyber.1aw.harvard.edu/media/files/eucd.pdf
158.

LUCCHI, DIGITAL MEDIA & INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 67 (2006); 17 U.S.C.

§1201(d)-(j)

(1999).
159. See Neil A. Benchell, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act: A Review of the Law
and the Court's Interpretation,2 BUFF. INTELL. PRO. L.J. 30, 45 (2003-2004).
160. See GASSER, supra note 157, at 17.
161. See Richard Li-Dar Wang, DMCA Anti-Circumvention Provisions in a Different
Light: Perspectivesfrom TransnationalObservationof Five Jurisdictions,34 AIPLA Q. J. 217,
243 (2006).
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It depends on two aspects of the technological protection measure in
question.
First, what works does the technological protection measure
protect? The more works a technological protection measure protects,
the more the user's authority to use his computer is diminished. For
example, if the technological protection measure protects all system
files and all files ever installed on the system, the owner's authority is
practically reduced to zero.
Second, and probably more importantly, to what else does the
technological protection measure effectively prevent access? Even if
the technological protection measure only protects an insignificant
graphic work in the form of a small JPEG file, stored somewhere on
the operating system's file system, the technological protection
measure might nevertheless result in a very significant deauthorization if it does not only prevent access to said JPEG file (i.e.
by means of file encryption) but to the entire file system altogether.
This is essentially why technological protection measures that protect
works other than computer programs can have an equally deauthorizing effect.
In the example above, the breadth of de-authorization would not
be proportional to the protected work because the owner of the
computer would be de-authorized to directly access any and all files
in the file system (of which there may be thousands) only to protect a
single file. However, proportionality to the protected work is not a
requirement under 17 U.S.C. § 1201, or the EUCPD. By contrast
Recital 48 of the EUCD does state that the legal protection of
technological protection measures "should respect proportionality."l 6 2
This is not sufficient to exempt all "overly protective" technological
protection measures from the legal protection afforded by the plain
language of Article 6(1) of the EUCD. Recital 48 of the EUCD makes
clear that any national law adopted pursuant to Article 6(1) only has
to be proportional in the sense that it also specifically refers in the
same sentence to "should not prohibit those devices or activities
which have a commercially significant purpose or use other than to

See Richard Li-Dar Wang, DMCA Anti-Circumvention Provisions in a Different
161.
Light: Perspectivesfrom TransnationalObservationof Five Jurisdictions,34 AIPLA Q. J. 217,
243 (2006).
162. See Parliament and Council Directive 2001/29, 2001 O.J (L167) 10-19 (EC). Cf also
Treaty on European Union as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon art. 5(4), 2006 O.J. (C 321 E)
(stating that "[u]nder the principle of proportionality, the content and form of Union action shall
not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties.").
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circumvent the technical protection."l 63 In light of Recital 48, the
comprehensive meaning of Article 6(1) is therefore to be understood
as demanding proportionality with regard to a circumvention
technology's alternative use(s).
Ultimately, 17 U.S.C. § 1201, the EUCD, and the EUCPD give
copyright holders the legal power to create closed systems 164 and to
protect these systems from any interference by the owner of the
personal computer. As discussed infra, this drastically reduces the
owner's capability to mitigate risks to which the personal computer is
exposed. 165 Furthermore, it increases the homogeneity of personal
computers resulting in a higher probability of "class breaks" (as
defined infra in part 4.3), possibly compromising entire product
lines. 166
3. AUTHORIZING THIRD PARTIES

3.1. Authorizing Vendors to Hinder the Functioningof the
Computer

Some end-user license agreements contain a provision that
supposedly grants the vendor the authority to hinder the functioning
of the licensed software if the licensee (usually the owner of the
computer) is deemed in violation of the terms of the contract. This is
particularly severe if the software in question is an operating system.
For example, the Microsoft Software License Terms for
Windows 7 provide in § 5.c:
If, after a validation check, the software is found to be counterfeit,
improperly licensed, a non-genuine Windows product, or include
unauthorized changes, the functionality and experience of using
the software will be affected, for example: [. . .] you may not be
able to use or continue to use the software or some of the features

163.
164.

Parliament and Council Directive 2001/29, 2001 O.J (L167) 10-19 (EC).
See TIMOTHY B. LEE, CIRCUMVENTING COMPETITION: THE

PERVERSE
CONSEQUENCES OF THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT, CATO INSTITUTE 3, (Policy

Analysis no. 564) (2006), http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa564.pdf (for a description of the
powers bestowed to copyright holders by the DMCA).; Parliament and Council Directive
2001/29, 2001 O.J (L167) 10-19 (EC); Parliament and Council Directive 2009/24, 2009 O.J. (L
111) 16-22 (EC).
165. See Whitfield Diffie, Risky Business: Keeping Security a Secret, ZDNET, Jan. 16,
2003, http://www.zdnet.com/news/risky-business-keeping-security-a-secret/127072.
166. See Posting of Jacob West to The Last Watchdog on Internet Security, Windows vs.
Linux Security Strengths and Weaknesses, http://lastwatchdog.com/windows-vs-linux-securitystrengths-weaknesses/ (Oct. 23, 2009).
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Contract provisions like the one cited above raise the question of
whether they would be enforceable. This issue is discussed below
under US law and EU law.
3.1.1. Enforceability Under US Law
Due to the economic importance of the State of California, the
following discussion will focus exclusively on California state law. 68
End-user license agreements usually come in the form of shrink-wrap
or click-wrap contracts.
Shrink-wrap contracts are contracts of adhesion shipped inside
retail software packages and therefore are not accessible to the user
before opening the package. The user is only left with the choice of
either accepting the terms by using the software or rejecting them by
returning the package to the store. In ProCD v. Zeidenberg, the 7th
Circuit famously held that shrink-wrap contracts are indeed
enforceable.169 However, as shrink-wrap contracts simply employ a
different method of contract formation, they are still vulnerable to
general contract defenses, in particular, unconscionability.170
Click-wrap contracts are very similar to shrink-wrap contracts in
the sense that the licensee can either "take-it" (and enter the contract)
"or-leave-it" (and not enter the contract)."171 The only difference is
that the click-wrap terms are not printed on paper but are displayed on
a computer screen. The user can either accept the terms by clicking on
an acceptance button or reject the terms by aborting the installation.
Today, almost all standard software products employ click-wrap
167. Microsoft Software License Terms Windows 7 Home Basic - §5(c) Validation,
http://www.microsoft.com/About/Legal/EN/US/IntellectualProperty/UseTerms/Default.aspx
(last visited Sept. 12, 2010) (emphasis added).
168. The interpretation of the specific license cited above is governed by Washington state
law. See Microsoft Software License Terms Windows 7 Home Basic - §26(a) Applicable Law,
http://www.microsoft.com/About/Legal/EN/US/IntellectualPropertyUseTerms/Default.aspx
(last visited Sept. 12, 2010). For a discussion of the Washington unconscionability standard and
its application on the Windows Vista EULA see Rebecca K. Lively, Microsoft Windows Vista:
The Beginning or the End ofEnd-User License Agreements as We Know Them?, 39 ST. MARY'S
L. J. 339, 358-367 (2007).
169. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996).
170. Cf MAUN, supra note 3, at 764.
Explained,
Agreement
Wrap
Shrink
171. Helium.com,
http://www.helium.com/knowledge/221248-shrink-wrap-agreement-explained (last visited Oct.
7, 20 10); see also Kevin Grierson, Enforceabilityof "Clickwrap" or "Shrinkwrap" Agreements
Common in Computer Software, Hardware, and Internet Transactions, 106 A.L.R. 5th 309
(2003). See also Nancy S. Kim, The Software Licensing Dilemma, 2008 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1103,
1152 (2008).
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contracts. Like shrink-wrap contracts, click-wrap contracts are
enforceable but subject to defenses such as unconscionability.172
Under California contract law, the doctrine of unconscionability
has a procedural and a substantive element. The procedural element
focuses on oppression or surprise due to unequal bargaining power
while the substantive element focuses on overly harsh or one-sided
results.173 A contract provision is unenforceable due to
unconscionability only if both elements are satisfied. However, the
two prerequisites "need not both be present to the same degree." 174 A
"sliding scale" is to be applied so that "the more substantively
oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural
unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term
is unenforceable, and vice versa." 7 5
The procedural element of an unconscionable contract generally
takes the form of a contract of adhesion. Under California law, a
contract of adhesion is defined as "a standardized contract imposed
upon the subscribing party without an opportunity to negotiate the
terms."1 76 "If imposed and drafted by the party of superior bargaining
strength, a contract of adhesion relegates to the subscribing party only
the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it" ("take it or leave
it" approach).1 77 "Absent unusual circumstances, use of a contract of
of procedural
degree
minimal
a
establishes
adhesion
unconscionability notwithstanding the availability of market
alternatives." 78 End-user license agreements used by any of the major
software vendors therefore satisfy the procedural element of
unconscionability.

172. See Kevin Grierson, Enforceability of "Clickwrap" or "Shrinkwrap" Agreements
Common in Computer Software, Hardware, and Internet Transactions, 106 A.L.R. 5th 309
§3[a], [b], [h] (2003). See Maun, supranote 3, at 765.
173. See Stephen A. Broome, An Unconscionable Application of the Unconscionability
Doctrine: How the California Judiciary is Circumventing the Federal Arbitration Act, 3
Hastings Bus. L.J. 39, 48 (2006).
See also Davis v. 0'Melveny & Myers, 485 F.3d 1066, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007).
174. Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Services, Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1280 (9th Cir. 2006)).
175. Id. at 981-82 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Serv.,
Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 2000)).
176. Id. at 983 (quoting Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1281 (citations
omitted) (9th Cir. 2006)).
177. Id. at 982 (quoting Discover Bank v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 30 Cal.4th 148,
160 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 2005)).
178. Id. at 985. CfGatton v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 152 Cal.App.4th 571, 585 (Cal. Ct. App.
2007).
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The substantive element of the unconscionability analysis
focuses on overly harsh or one-sided results.' 79 When applying these
loose principles to any contract provision that authorizes the licensor
of operating system software to disable the operating system, two
aspects require further analysis.
The first aspect is the extent to which the law protects the
owner's interest in ensuring that the functionality of the operating
system running on his computer is not hindered. It is important to
emphasize that a disabled operating system renders the entire personal
computer effectively useless-that is until a new operating system is
installed. Furthermore it needs to be noted that, in the case of
Windows 7 Professional, "the software will from time to time
perform a validation check of the software" which "may be initiated
by the software or Microsoft."' 8 0 This means that the deactivation of
one's system may occur at any time during the lifetime of the
operating system.
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA)' 8 ' prohibits
"intentionally caus[ing] damage without authorization, to a protected
computer" by "knowingly caus[ing] the transmission of a program,
information, code, or command." 82 The CFAA also prohibits
"intentionally access[ing] a protected computer without authorization,
and as a result of such conduct, recklessly caus[ing] damage." 83 The
CFAA protects, inter alia, a computer "used in or affecting interstate
or foreign commerce or communication, including a computer located
outside the United States that is used in a manner that affects
interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the United
States." 84 The statutory damage threshold is $5,000, but the damages
179. Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Services, Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Discover Bank v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 30 Cal.4th 148, 160 (Cal. Sup. Ct.
2005)).
180. Microsoft Software License Terms for Windows 7 Professional, § 5(b),
http://download.microsoft.com/Documents/UseTerms/Windows%207 ProfessionalEnglish_7b
b89e9f-20ea-4555-892f-394539ec 1090.pdf (last visited Sept. 12, 2010).
181. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (LexisNexis 2010).
182. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A).
183.
18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(B).
184. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B). As regards computers located in the U.S., "used in or
affecting interstate [...] commerce" has been interpreted very broadly, effectively covering any
computer connected to the Internet. See United States v. Trotter, 478 F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir.
2007) (holding that, with a connection to the Internet, the victim's computers that were located
in Missouri were part of a system that is inexorably intertwined with interstate commerce and
thus protected under 18 U.S.C. § 1030, irrespective of the victim organization's not-for-profit
status). Cf also MARK G. MILONE, INFORMATION SECURITY LAW: CONTROL OF DIGITAL

ASSETS

§ 9.01[l]

(2009).
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caused to different computers over a period of one year might be
aggregated.' 8 ' Disabling operating systems without permission might
therefore constitute a federal crime in the United States.
Furthermore, California Penal Code § 502(c)(4) provides that
any person who "[k]nowingly accesses and without permission adds,
alters, damages, deletes, or destroys any data, computer software, or
computer programs which reside or exist internal or external to a
computer, computer system, or computer network" is guilty of a
public offense. 18 6 California Penal Code § 502(c)(5) defines a similar
public offense against any person who "[k]nowingly and without
permission disrupts or causes the disruption of computer services or
denies or causes the denial of computer services to an authorized user
of a computer, computer system, or computer network."187 Disabling
an operating system without permission therefore constitutes a public
offense under California Penal Code § 502(c)(5) and under §
502(c)(4).' The CFAA and California Penal Code § 502(c) express
the value attributed not only to the confidentiality and integrity of
data but also to the integrity and availability of (personal) computers
in general.
The second aspect involves the conditions that must be met
before the software vendor is authorized to deactivate the operating
system. These conditions essentially determine the interest the
software vendor might have in disabling the system. The Windows 7
example (quoted above) uses the following triggers: "the software is
found to be counterfeit, improperly licensed, a non-genuine Windows
product, or includ[ing] unauthorized changes." 8 9 The last trigger
seems particularly harsh given the fact that it also covers users who
have paid their license fees and have only made modifications to the
software that are covered by the fair use doctrine. The other triggers
can be equated to the licensor's interest in receiving a license fee.
However, irrespective of the particular trigger, the determination of
whether all conditions are met ultimately rests with the software
vendor.' 90 When compared to the traditional recourse provided by the
185. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(I). See The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,
Information Security Law: Control of Digital Assets §9.01[2][c][ii] (aggravated counts).
186. CAL. PENAL CODE § 502(c)(5) (LexisNexis 2010).
187. Id.
188. Id. at (c)(4)-(5).
189. Microsoft Software License Terms for Windows 7 Professional, § 5(c),
http://download.microsoft.com/Documents/UseTerms/Windows%207_Professional English 7b
b89e9f-20ea-4555-892f-394539ecl090.pdf (last visited Sept. 12, 2010).
190. See Mark Rasch, Vista's EULA Product Activation Worries, SECURITY Focus, Nov.
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legal system, this constitutes a form of "self-help"19 1 that reverses the
burdens of the vendor and the user. It is now the user who has to
initiate recourse to the courts if he is of the opinion that he did not
violate the terms of the license.
This reversal of positions combined with the drastic effects of
the disabling of an operating system should encourage a court to favor
a finding of substantive unconscionability that tips the "sliding scale,"
and consequently rendering the contract provision unconscionable
and unenforceable. However, it is to be expected that at least some
courts will not follow this reasoning, leaving users with considerable
legal uncertainty.
3.1.2. Enforceability Under EU Law
EU law on international jurisdiction and conflict of laws shall be
discussed first before considering substantive EU contract law
regarding the issue of enforceability. As many end-user license
agreements stipulate an exclusive US jurisdiction, 192 the issue of
international jurisdiction is of particular importance. Article 15 of the
Brussels I Regulationl 9 3 provides that the consumer-specific rules on
jurisdiction apply if, inter alia, "the contract has been concluded
between a consumerl 94 and a person who pursues commercial or
professional activities in the Member State of the consumer's
domicile or . . . directs such activities to that Member State . . . "

"and the contract falls within the scope of such activities."' 95 As most
vendors of standard software direct their activities to all EU Member
States by means of Internet advertising, and as Article 15 of the
Brussels I Regulation covers all types of contracts,19 6 consumerspecific rules on jurisdiction apply. According to Article 16(1) of the

20, 2006, http://www.securityfocus.com/columnists/423 (discussing Microsoft as one such
software vendor).
191. Id.
192. See
e.g.,
Subfolio,
End
User
License
Agreement,
http://www.subfolio.com/04_download.txt (last visited Oct. 7, 2010).
193. Council Regulation 44/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1-23 (EC) [hereinafter Council
Regulation 44/2001].
194. Council Directive 93/13, art. 2(b), 1993 O.J. (L 95) 31 (EC) (defines "consumer" as
"any natural person who [...] is acting for purposes which are outside his trade, business or
profession").
195. Council Regulation 44/200 1, supranote 193, at 6.
196. See Case C-180/06, Ilsinger v. Dreschers, 2009 E.C.R.153, (Recital 50 holds that
"art. 15(l)(c) Brussels I Regulation covers [apart from certain transport] all contracts, whatever
their purpose, if they have been concluded by a consumer with a professional and fall within the
latter's commercial or professional activities.").
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Brussels I Regulation, "a consumer may bring proceedings against the
other party" in the courts where the consumer or party is domiciled.197
This is also the only jurisdiction in which proceedings may be
brought against the consumer. Under Article 17 of the Brussels I
Regulation, contractual derogation of these provisions that would
transfer exclusive jurisdiction to the US may be possible if a
corresponding agreement is entered into after the dispute has
arisen. 19 8 Contract provisions that provide for exclusive jurisdiction in
the US are therefore of no legal consequence to EU consumers.
The national law applicable to a consumer contract is to be
determined under Article 6 of the Rome I Regulation. 199 In general, a
consumer contract is governed by the law of the country where the
consumer has his habitual residence if, inter alia, the professional by
any means, directs his commercial or professional activities to that
country and the contract falls within the scope of these activities. 00
According to Article 6(2) of the Rome I Regulation, the parties may
choose a different law. 2 0 1 However, such a choice may not have the
result of depriving the consumer of the protection afforded to him by
ius cogens202 which, in the absence of choice, would have been
applicable.2 03 Depending on the consumer's habitual residence, a
large body of substantive consumer protection law might be
applicable, ultimately determining whether a provision that grants the
software vendor the authority to hinder the functioning of the licensed
software is enforceable or not.
Article 3(1) of the Unfair Terms Directive,204 which has been
implemented by all Member States, is of particular importance in this
regard. It provides that a contractual term in a pre-formulated
standard contract shall be regarded as unfair and not binding2 on the
consumer if, "contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a
significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations arising
under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer." 206 Article 3(1)

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
the law).
203.
204.
205.
206.

Council Regulation 44/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 7 (EC).
Id
Parliament and Council Regulation 593/2008, art. 6, 2008 O.J. (L 177) 10-11 (EC).
Id
Id at 12.
Id. (referred as provisions that cannot be derogated from by agreement by virtue of
Id
Council Directive 93/13, 1993 O.J. (L 95) 311 (EC).
Id
Id
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of the Unfair Terms Directive therefore serves a similar purpose as
the unconscionability doctrine in US law.207
3.2. Authorizing Vendors to Automatically Downloadand Install
"Updates"
Today, many end-user software license agreements contain a
provision that grants the software vendor the authority to secretly
initialize the download and installation of "updates." For example, the
Google Chrome Terms of Service, which apply to the executable code
version of the Google Chrome browser, state in § 11.1:
The Software which you use may automatically download and
install updates from time to time from Google. These updates are
designed to improve, enhance and further develop the Services and
may take the form of bug fixes, enhanced functions, new software
modules and completely new versions. You agree to receive such

updates (and permit Google to deliver these to you) as part of your
use of the Services. 208
Another example is the license agreement and terms of use for
Amazon Kindle, which state under § 4:
Automatic Updates. In order to keep your Software up-to-date,
Amazon may automatically 2 rovide your Device with
updates/upgradesto the Software.
Similarly, the license agreement for Norton AntiVirus or Norton
Internet Security states in § 2.A:
In order to optimize the Software Symantec may, at its discretion
and without notice, add, modify or remove features from the
Software at any time.210
The warranty disclaimer and software license agreement for
Adobe Reader 9.0 and Adobe Flash Player 10.0 provides in § 6.2:
"Updating. You acknowledge and agree that the Software may cause
your Computer to automatically connect to the Internet to check for

207.

Cf. Council Directive 93/13 on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, art. 3(1), 1993

O.J. (L 95) 29 (EC).
208. Google.com, Google Chrome Terms of Service, http://www.google.com/chrome/intl/
en/eulatext.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2010) (emphasis added).
209. Amazon.com, Amazon Kindle: License Agreement and Terms of Use (Feb. 9, 2009),
http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeld=200144530 (last visited Sept.
7, 2010) (emphasis added).
210. Symantec, Norton License Agreement: Norton AntiVirus or Norton Internet Security,
http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/about/media/NAV-NIS 2010_EULA.pdf (last visited
Sept. 7, 2010).

2011]1

SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP

167

updates" (i.e. upgrades, modified versions, updates, additions, and

copies of the foregoing, provided to you by Adobe at any time (see
§ 1 Definitions)) 211 "that are available for automatic download to your
Computer and to let Adobe know the Software is successfully
installed."2 12
Furthermore, Adobe's general Terms of Use, that supposedly
cover "[a]ny Software that is made available via the Site" given that
"no license agreement accompanies the Software" provides in § 4.c:
The Software may automatically download and install updates
from Adobe from time to time. These updates are designed to
improve, enhance and further develop the Services and may take
the form of bug fixes, enhanced functions, new Software modules
and completely new versions. You agree to receive such updates

(and permit Adobe to deliver these to you with or without your
knowledge) as part of your use of the Services. 213
3.2.1. Enforceability Under EU and US Law
Contract provisions that supposedly authorize vendors to secretly
initialize the download and installation of additional software,
including security updates, should be seen in comparison to the
contract provisions discussed in part 3.1 which supposedly authorize
vendors to hinder the functioning of the entire computer.
Applying the unconscionability standard of California contract
law, 214 it seems rather unlikely that a court would find the automatic
download and installation of software to constitute a sufficiently onesided result.
However, it should be noted that these contract provisions grant
software vendors significant authority over a user's personal
computer. This is particularly so because the authority to
automatically download and install software does not only cover
security updates but also feature updates (referred to in the above
contract provisions as "completely new versions," "upgrades," or

211. Adobe.com, Adobe Flash Player 10.0 or Adobe Reader 9.0: Product License
Agreements,
http://www.adobe.com/products/eulas/pdfs/ReaderPlayer AIRWWEULACombined-20080204_1313.pdf (last visited January 26, 2011).
212. Adobe, Adobe Systems Incorporated: Warranty Disclaimer and Software License
Agreement,
http://www.adobe.com/products/eulas/pdfs/ReaderPlayer AIR WWEULACombined-20080204_1313 .pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2010).
213. Adobe,
Adobe
Terms
of
Use
(Apr.
30,
2010),
http://www.adobe.com/misce/copyright.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2010) (emphasis added).
214. See part 3.1.1 supra.
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"additions").2 15
Even if the authority was limited to the installation of security
updates (often referred to as "patches"), concerns for the security of a
personal computer might still exist. A patch might turn out to be
incompatible with certain third party software or might otherwise
eliminate functionality on which the user relies. Ultimately a patch
might therefore constitute a threat to the availability of certain
services or applications. This is precisely why the patch management
process of many corporations includes the testing of patches.216
However, as owners of personal computers generally lack the
motivation and resources to perform any testing of patches, a quick
installation of available security patches is usually in the best interest
of the security of a personal computer. Furthermore, an argument can
be made that forcing users to install security updates increases the
overall level of security.
However, no such arguments can be made for the automatic
installation of feature updates. 2 17 Every new feature is necessarily
accompanied by new security vulnerabilities. 218 Whether or not the
increased productivity provided by the new feature outweighs the
newly introduced vulnerabilities, is a matter for risk-benefit analysis.
If the user does not even want to use the new feature, installing it
would therefore be contrary to the (security) interests of the user.
Furthermore, the automatic installation of additional software
components, other than security updates, leads to a situation where
the owner of a personal computer has no idea what software is
installed on his computer. This is problematic as vendors only seek

215. Cf StopBadware.org, Software Guidelines, http://stopbadware.org/home/guidelines
(last visited Sept. 9, 2010) (stating under §III.A: "Application installations must be designed in a
manner that ensures that an application is installed by end users in a knowing and willful
manner. Applications which install deceptively are always considered badware .... Automaticupdating is permissible, however, if the use of automatic-updates is clearly disclosed to the user
during installation of the application and either is used only to make non-substantive updates to
the application itself or seeks the user's consent before making any changes. Automatic-updates
may not modify other software or be used to introduce substantive changes to the original
application's functionality. ..

).

216. Cf Felicia M. Nicastro, Security Patch Management: The Process, in INFORMATION
SECURITY MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK 185, 195 (Harold F. Tipton & Micki Krause eds., 6th ed.
2007).
217. For a strong argument of why patches should be kept separate from feature updates
see Ross ANDERSON ET AL., SECURITY ECONOMICS AND THE INTERNAL MARKET 5, 64 (2008),

http://www.enisa.europa.eu/act/sr/reports/econ-sec/economics-sec/atdownload/fullReport.
218. Programmer and security expert "Wietse Venema estimates that there is roughly one
security bug per 1000 lines in his source code." MARK G. GRAFF & KENNETH R. VAN WYK,
SECURE CODING: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 5 (O'Reilly 2003).
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the authority to install security and feature updates as they wish but
do not accept any responsibilityfor installing the security updates. If
security updates are not made available users might want to uninstall
the software altogether. However, if users do not know that a certain
software component is installed on their system, they cannot be
expected to either manually install patches for it or uninstall the
software. The automatic installation of new features without the
specific knowledge of the owner of the personal computer therefore
effectively reduces the level of security of the personal computer.
Although the effects on the security of a personal computer are
significant, they are certainly not comparable to the disablement of
the entire operating system. In the absence of substantive
unconscionability, contract provisions granting the vendor the
authority to secretly install updates would therefore have to be
enforced under applicable contract law. Whether a court of an EU
Member State would find that such a contract provision "contrary to
the requirement of good faith, [. . .] causes a significant imbalance in

the parties' rights and obligations arising under the contract" will
largely depend on the Member State's implementation of Article 3(1)
219
of the Unfair Terms Directive.
4. EFFECTS ON THE SECURITY OF PERSONAL COMPUTERS
Both EU and US law lead to a disconnection of the concept of
ownership and the concept of authorization to use a personal
computer. The legal protection of technological protection measures
leads to a significant de-authorization of the owner of a personal
computer, while the enforcement of contract provisions granting
software vendors the authority to secretly install additional software
or hinder the functioning of the operating system results in the
authorization of somebody other than the owner. The following
sections analyze how this disconnection affects the security of
personal computers and IT security in general.
4.1. Ownership and the Burden of the Security Risk
Generally, the owner of a personal computer is the one person
who suffers most should his personal computer become
compromised. Malware threatens the confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of the owner's stored data and communications.
Additionally, malware is often not programmed well or incompatible

219.

Council Directive 93/13, art. 3, 1993 O.J. (L 95) 311 (EC).
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to other malware running on the compromised system, ultimately
threatening the functioning of the entire computer. It can therefore be
said that the bearing of the security risks a personal computer is
exposed to, is very much connected to the concept of ownership of
the personal computer.
4.2. Reducing the Owner's Capability to Mitigate Security Risks
The de-authorization of the owner to use certain software
components of his personal computer combined with the
authorization of third parties effectively reduces the owner's
capabilities to mitigate the security risks to which his computer is
exposed. 22 0 All risks consist of the following components: an asset,
vulnerabilities, safeguards, threats, and threat agents.221 While threats
(e.g. an exploit 2 22 for a newly discovered vulnerability) and threat
agents (e.g. a new criminal organization) are beyond the influence of
an individual, the first three risk components (assets, vulnerabilities,
safeguards) can generally be altered by the owner of a personal
computer-that is if the law permits the owner to act.
What and how much data (i.e. assets) are being stored on the
computer is generally within the sole discretion of the owner of the
computer. That of course is not the case where a technological
protection measure prevents access to certain data. For example,
temporary files are often kept longer than they are needed. Their
existence creates the risk that their confidentiality might be
compromised. The best risk mitigation strategy would be to remove
the unneeded temporary files, thereby eliminating the risk. If,
however, technological protection measures prevent access to these
files or even parts of the entire file system (as does the iPhone or the
iPad),223 removal of the files is not possible.224

220. Note that the de-authorization of the owner may also have the positive effect that
fewer Trojan horses (software that appears legitimate but contains hidden malicious
functionality) are installed by users on their systems. However, since Trojan horses are a rather
insignificant threat when compared to the wide array of other threats, the positive effects of deauthorization are indeed limited. But cf JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET-

AND How To STOP IT 57, 150 (Yale U. Press 2008) (disregarding other threats than Trojan
horses on Skype and arguing that closed systems would be more secure than open systems).
221. For further discussion of these risk components see DOUGLAS J. LANDOLL, THE
SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK 29-34, 36-7 (Auerbach 2006); HARRIS SHON, CISSP
CERTIFICATION ALL-IN-ONE EXAM GUIDE 61 (4th ed. 2008).

222. The term exploit refers to "programs that automatically test a vulnerability and in
most cases attempt to leverage that vulnerability by executing code." JAMES C. FOSTER ET AL.,
BUFFER OVERFLOW ATTACKS 10 (Syngress Pub. Inc. 2005).

223.

The iPhone's and the iPad's operating system "iOS" prevents applications-and
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Eliminating vulnerabilities in standard software usually involves
the software vendor issuing a patch for the vulnerability. However,
installing a patch is not the only way to eliminate a vulnerability. The
software component that contains the vulnerability might also be
uninstalled altogether by the owner. This of course requires that: (1)
the owner is aware that the software is installed on his system, and (2)
he has the authority to uninstall it. The first requirement is not
fulfilled if vendors are granted and subsequently exercise the
authority to secretly install new software. The second requirement
cannot be met if the software component itself (or the means to
uninstall it) is protected by an access control measure whose
circumvention is prohibited.22 5
The installation of additional safeguards allows the owner to
prevent the exploitation of known vulnerabilities that cannot be
eliminated (e.g. installing a personal firewall to prevent the
exploitation of a vulnerability in a network-enabled service) or that
are yet unknown (e.g. installing an intrusion detection system, in case
the system is compromised). Furthermore, additional safeguards can
compensate for other safeguards that prove ineffective to a certain
threat.226 However, installing additional safeguards requires a certain
amount of access to one's own computer. If such access is prevented
by a technological protection measure (e.g. by preventing the
installation of applications that are not "authorized" by the vendor),
no safeguards can be added to the system.
The disconnection of the concept of ownership and the concept
of authorization to use a personal computer therefore drastically
reduces the owner's capabilities to mitigate security risks.
4.3. Increasingthe Possibilityof Class Breaks by Promoting
Homogeneity
Class breaks can be defined as "attacks that can break every
thereby users running them-from accessing files outside an application-specific area in the file
system, referred to as a sandbox. See APPLE, INC., IOS APPLICATION PROGRAMMING GUIDE 15

(2010), available at http://developer.apple.com/library/ios/documentation/iPhone/Conceptual/
iPhoneOSProgrammingGuide/iPhoneAppProgrammingGuide.pdf (last accessed Oct. 16, 2010).
224. See Part 2.1.2.1 supra for a discussion on 17 U.S.C. § 1201(i) and its very limited
scope.
225. As uninstalling the entire software cannot be equated to "good faith testing,
investigating, or correcting, a security flaw or vulnerability," the security exemption provided in
17 U.S.C. § 1201(j) does not apply.
226. This principle is known as Defense in Depth. STEPHEN NORTHCUTT ET AL., INSIDE
NETWORK PERIMETER SECURITY: THE DEFINITIVE GUIDE TO FIREWALLS, VPNs, ROUTERS, AND
INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS 613-14 (New Riders 2003).

172

SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 27

instance of some feature in a security system." 227 This means that a
certain kind of attack can be used to compromise not just one
computer but an entire "class" of computers. Homogeneity of
computer systems leads to larger "classes" that share the same
security properties and are therefore vulnerable to the same kind of
attack. By using a different word processor, browser, anti-virus
software or personal firewall, owners of personal computers are able
to achieve some level of diversity, irrespective of the operating
system chosen. That diversity, however, is drastically reduced if the
owner is not anymore able to choose freely between the different
alternatives available on the market. Technological protection
measures can be and are being used to allow the owner only the
installation of third party applications specifically authorized by the
software vendor. If the software vendor only authorizes one single
application for each application category, effectively granting certain
third parties a monopoly within his customer base, 2 28 diversity is
eliminated altogether. This increases the probability of class breaks
which, depending on the size of the homogenous customer base, can
have a very high impact on the entire society.
4.4 Insufficient Incentivesfor Authorized Third Partiesto
Mitigate Risks
As discussed above, the disconnection of the concept of
ownership and the concept of authorization to use a personal
computer is problematic as it decreases the risk mitigation capabilities
of the entity bearing most of the risk (the owner). This disconnection
creates another problem: it transfers the risk mitigation capability to
an entity (the software vendor) that has insufficient incentives to
actually mitigate the risks.
Software vendors do not accept any liability for the security of
their products, or for a timely issuance of security patches, should
vulnerabilities be discovered. Vendors therefore only bear the
(security) risks related to their products to the extent that a public
relations problem might arise. The security risks are therefore still
primarily borne by the owners of the computers on which the product
is installed. This leaves the vendors with insufficient incentives to use

227.

BRUCE SCHNEIER, BEYOND FEAR 93 (Copernicus Books 2003).

228.

Companies selling (exclusive)

access to their customer base is a long-standing

practice. See CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE To

THE NETWORK EcoNOMY 162 (Harv, Bus. Sch. Press 1999).
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their risk mitigation capability effectively. 229
5.

CONCLUSION

EU and US law increasingly disconnect the concept of
ownership and the concept of authorization to use personal
computers. On the one hand, the prohibition of the circumvention of
technological protection measures as provided for in 17 U.S.C.
§ 1201, in the EU Computer Programs Directive, and in the EU
Copyright Directive, effectively de-authorizes the owner of a personal
computer to use certain software components of his computer. On the
other hand, the enforcement of contractual provisions that grant
software vendors the authority to secretly download and install
additional software or to even disable the licensed software, should
the licensee be deemed in violation of the terms, effectively grants
significant authority over a personal computer to somebody other than
the owner, namely the software vendor. This disconnection has
substantial negative effects on the security of personal computers.
While the owner's capability to mitigate security risks is reduced, the
vendor to whom the risk mitigation capability is transferred has
insufficient incentives to use this capability. Furthermore, the deauthorization of owners leads to more homogenous systems, thereby
increasing the possibility of class breaks.

229. Cf Bruce Schneier, Make Vendors Liable for Bugs (June 6, 2006), WIRED.COM,
2006
/06/71032, reprinted
http://www.wired.com/politics/security/commentary/securitymatters/
for the introduction of
(arguing
(2008)
147-49
ON
SECURITY
in BRUCE SCHNEIER, SCHNEIER
software liability because "[s]oftware vendors are in the best position to improve software
security" but "don't have much interest [in doing so]").
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